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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY GOOD PRACTICES  TAX REDUCTION OR DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE  CORPORATE INTEREST PHILANTHROPY AND THE ADVENT OF MISSION-LED BUSINESSES

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY GOOD PRACTICES TAX REDUCTION OR DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE CORPORATE INTEREST PHILANTHROPY AND THE ADVENT OF MISSION-LED BUSINESSES

Corporate philanthropy is faring well, even though it is still a recent practice compared to philanthropy overall. In France, corporate philanthropy effectively stems from the law on corporate foundations adopted relatively recently, on 4 July 1990[1].

It is in fact quite significant to see how difficult it was for the members of parliament at the time to address the possibility of a business engaging in philanthropic operations, since the practice could not be separated from the company’s profit-making purpose.

One Member of Parliament said at the time: “we must remember that corporate philanthropy is naturally part of a company’s purpose. Its purpose cannot be disinterested and is logically and legally that of making profit, whether we like it or not”[2].

However, in 28 years, corporate philanthropy has definitely become part of the French philanthropy landscape to the point of becoming a key feature.

The national fund-raising overview presented in April 2018 by the Fondation de France is particularly enlightening in this regard[3].
Based on figures available in 2015, corporate philanthropy is estimated at a total of €3.5 billion across all sizes of business. But most surprisingly, according to Admical, only 55% of corporate patrons benefit from tax reduction under the preferential tax treatment of corporate philanthropy (Article 238 bis of the French Tax Code).
This finding is noteworthy, as it shows that while more than 50% of companies apply the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy allowing a tax reduction of 60% of the donation made, other businesses, which do not apply it, treat their philanthropic operations as company expenses.
The question is simple: over and above its widespread use, does a company have a choice between these two possibilities? And if so, on which bases can a company’s philanthropic expenditures be considered a tax-deductible expense?
Some authors are of the opinion that philanthropy cannot be a deductible expense since its very definition implies a donative intent and therefore the absence of any consideration for the company.

Corporate philanthropy would therefore necessarily be subject to the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy, as otherwise, it would be sponsorship expenditure representing consideration for the company which is the only way to justify its deductibility as an expense.
This analysis is important as it would require companies to limit their philanthropic expenditures to the tax deductibility threshold of 5‰ of revenue. Above that amount, the expense would be neither deductible from tax, nor an expense deductible from profit.

In practice, this is not the case, and therefore, good practices must be identified for corporate philanthropy to clearly determine the legal and fiscal certainty that a business needs to invest seriously in philanthropy, in connection with the company’s strategy, i.e. the certainty necessary for the very development of philanthropy.

This issue is particularly acute at present. Against a backdrop of discussions around the status of companies as an “object of collective interest”[4] and at a time when CSR (corporate social responsibility) has taken root in modern-day business, questions arise as to the compatibility between the very nature of a profit-making business and that of corporate philanthropy which, by being philanthropic, will impoverish the company without it receiving anything in return.

Yet, is philanthropy contrary to a company’s business?

This analysis calls firstly for a brief reminder of what philanthropy is. We will then address the question of compatibility between philanthropy and the economic purpose of a company.

  1. Reminder of the concept of philanthropy

Philanthropy is defined as “material support provided to an undertaking or to a person to carry out activities beneficial to the public, without receiving any direct consideration from the beneficiary” (Répertoire Terminologique, 2000 edition, issued by the Commission Générale de Terminologie et de Néologie).

A person who provides such support is referred to as a “patron”.

Legally speaking, philanthropy is a donation. A donation implies a donative intent, i.e. the intention to give by transferring an asset or a right belonging to one natural or legal person to another[5].

Donative intent means that there is no consideration or only consideration disproportionate to the donation made.

Donative intent is essential as otherwise the philanthropic operation will be challenged and regarded as an act for valuable consideration.

Therefore, philanthropy necessarily results in impoverishing the donator and the consideration granted to the patron must not challenge its intent to give, even if it is only symbolic.

Philanthropy is therefore a liberality. 

Liberality is a generic term encompassing all gratuitous acts. A distinction should therefore be made between liberalities inter vivos, and liberalities mortis causa (by will). A liberality inter vivos is therefore called a “donation”[6], whereas a liberality mortis causa is called a “legacy”[7].

As regards corporate philanthropy, companies are only concerned by donations, or liberalities inter vivos, since the death of a company cannot be envisaged as such.

A donation or gift is a contract which, to be performed, requires the beneficiary’s acceptance. The specific regime of donations[8] imposes a particular form for these acts to be valid and they must, in principle, be notarised[9].

In practice, however, an exception to this principle has developed with the gift by hand. This simplified form of donation only requires actual delivery of the asset, and therefore gifts by hand are limited to tangible personal property which can be given directly. With the development of digital technology, the technique has expanded to intangible property such as the giving of cheques, securities or bank transfers[10].

Contrary to common belief, there is no limit on the value of a gift by hand of a sum of money or property.

q By requiring direct delivery of the property, a gift by hand is therefore incompatible, for its implementation, with the drafting of a document; however, to be valid, the document must be notarised[11].

But here again, under certain conditions, a document may be written. For example, making a gift by hand does not preclude the possibility of drafting a philanthropy agreement to define the parties’ legitimate expectations. In fact, drafting such an agreement is important so that the corporate patron can justify its initiative with regard to its corporate interest, both internally (to employees or shareholders) and to third parties (tax administration).

The philanthropy agreement must then have the legal characteristics of a pacte adjoint à un don manuel (contract associated with a gift by hand).

Legal doctrine defines this contract as encompassing “the clauses included, stipulated in the gift by hand agreement, forming one with it and by which the parties arrange certain conditions of the transaction”[12].

Without going into the legal debates, we can at least say that the “pacte adjoint” serves to determine the terms and conditions of the gift by hand, such as reserving bare ownership or usufruct, or a stipulation of reversion. The “pacte adjoint” is also undeniably an instrument for proving the gift by hand, and its terms and conditions.

In terms of form, the corporate philanthropy agreement must not carry acceptance of the donation by the beneficiary, as a notarised instrument would then be required (Article 931 of the Civil Code); it must simply record or acknowledge the donation made. The corporate philanthropy agreement may not constitute a pledge either, as such a pledge is prohibited[13].

The corporate philanthropy agreement may correlatively set forth the conditions linked to the making of the gift, as agreed by the parties.

q In terms of taxation, revealing a gift by hand to the tax administration will, in principle, render it liable for registration duties[14] at the rate of 60%[15]. As an exception, a gift by hand of which the tax administration is aware will be exempted from registration duty if it meets the conditions required by the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy[16].

This is a key feature of the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy as, beyond the tax reduction granted to the patron, it also exempts the donation from registration duties (cf. § 2.1 below).

q In practice, a gift by hand is found under the following different forms:

  • philanthropy in cash implying the payment of a sum of money, in cash, by cheque or by bank transfer;
  • philanthropy in kind which may take the form of a thing purchased or produced by the company;
  • philanthropy by transfer of skills which is a form of philanthropy in kind but involves the corporate patron donating its company’s skills and more particularly those of its employees. This form of philanthropy generally gives rise to staff placement agreements.

A business may also make a donation by notarial act, and this is even compulsory when the very form of the donation requires such an act to be valid. This may be:

  • a donation of real property[17];
  • or a donation involving division of ownership, such as a temporary donation of usufruct[18]. It should be noted in this respect that the requirement of a notarial act results from tax administration doctrine, not from legislation. The tax administration’s doctrine is therefore challengeable.

The donation made must be compatible with the purpose pursued by the business, especially in the case of a legal entity.

The legal capacity of a business to make a donation must therefore be examined. This capacity stems from the Civil Code according to which all persons (natural or juridical) may dispose of their assets by donation, unless this possibility is restricted by specific legislation[19].

  1. Corporate patron: is philanthropy compatible with a business’s economic purpose? Performance of gratuitous acts by businesses

In the absence of legislation restricting the capacity of legal entities to dispose of their patrimony gratuitously, the principle of capacity means that legal persons, particularly businesses, are free to grant donations[20]. This principle of capacity is nonetheless limited to the achievement of their corporate object.

A business generally means an organisation which may or may not have juridical personality (this is the case of a sole proprietorship) and which aims to produce and supply products or services to a set of clients or users.

A business above all pursues an economic purpose by fostering the creation and distribution of wealth. Legally and by comparison with the Civil Code’s definition of a partnership, a business aims to share a profit or to make savings[21].

At first glance, the aim pursued by a business would seem incompatible with philanthropy, because the very definition of philanthropy is in contradiction with it.

As we mentioned above, philanthropy is generally defined as material support provided to an undertaking or to a person to carry out general-interest activities, without receiving any direct consideration from the beneficiary.

Philanthropy therefore implies a donative intent giving rise to the action of giving.

Therefore, following the philanthropic transaction, the patron will inevitably be impoverished, even though its generosity will be socially, intellectually or culturally valued.

The contradiction between business and philanthropy is therefore evident, since a business does not, in principle, intend to voluntarily impoverish itself, whereas philanthropy inevitably results in such impoverishment.

This contradiction is reinforced by the legal assessment of corporate interest, generally defined as the business’s pursuit of objectives, as a legal entity, which themselves generate savings or a profit.

Remark: for sole proprietorships, the issue is simpler. As a sole proprietorship is not a partnership and has no juridical personality, the notion of corporate interest, resulting from company law, is ineffective.

While the notion is justified by the juxtaposition of interests which can conflict within a company, it cannot have this role in a sole proprietorship where there is only one interest, i.e. that of the operator.

However, sole proprietorships are still concerned by the tax notion of ‘irregular act of management’ (see below).

A business having juridical personality is not totally free to undertake all acts. These acts must respect both the principle of the company’s specialisation, i.e. the activity for which it is established pursuant to its articles of association, and its corporate interest.

The decisions a business makes must be compliant with the corporate interest, and therefore be useful and profitable to the company[22].

The principle of legal entities’ specialisation is not just theoretical. It was repeated and codified in the new version of the French Civil Code issued in 2016. The new article 1145 paragraph 2 stipulates that “The capacity of juridical persons is restricted to the acts useful for the achievement of their purpose as defined by their bylaws and to the acts which are their accessories in compliance with the rules applicable to each one of them”.

Corporate interest stems from Article 1832 of the Civil Code, the current version of which (June 2018) defines the partnership contract and states that the legal purpose of any partnership is the making of profit or savings.

The content of corporate interest is debated in legal writings as to whether it corresponds to the interest of the partners or a broader interest attaching to the legal person itself. In either sense, corporate interest would appear, prima facie, to be inconsistent with philanthropy since, in one case, it deprives shareholders of a part of the distributable profit and, in the other, it reduces the revenue that the business needs to develop.

By economically impoverishing a legal entity business, philanthropy is therefore, in principle, contrary to its corporate interest. 

This analysis is confirmed by the tax rules applicable to the notion of irregular acts of management.

All these criteria therefore highlight the basic incompatibility between philanthropy and the business’s corporate interest (as an organisation having juridical personality), since philanthropy impoverishes the business and, as a matter of principle, the very aim pursued by a business is inconsistent with its voluntary impoverishment.

Beyond the current debate over companies as an “object of collective interest”, and more particularly “mission-led businesses”, philanthropy and a business’s corporate interest can be reconciled.

  • Philanthropy fosters the purpose pursued by a business: integrating the corporate interest

Despite the seeming contradiction between philanthropy and business, philanthropy allows a company to fully play its social role in society by asserting its connection between people and activity.

Thus, through its action, a corporate patron may take a series of initiatives that contribute to building a positive image of the company, both among its shareholders and employees, and among third parties.

This idea is particularly found in the “corporate social responsibility” concept which aims to integrate the social and environmental concerns of companies into their business operations and into their interaction with stakeholders[23].

In this regard, despite being seemingly contrary to the very purpose of a legal entity business, by resulting in its impoverishment, philanthropy can, on the contrary, enhance its reputation and image and therefore contribute to the development of its activity, even though there is no direct and proportionate consideration.

q Since the finance law for 2000[24] (and even since 1990 for corporate foundations), a corporate patron has been able to associate its name with its philanthropic actions. Now, following the development of corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSR), the image of economic players has become a growing concern, and it undeniably impacts a company’s business, particularly as regards consumers. The advertising done around such initiatives is a significant factor of corporate communication to improve a firm’s image and indirectly its business.

We can therefore infer that the proportionate commitment of a company’s revenue to philanthropic actions is not contrary to its corporate interest, and comes within the scope of its object, since it has positive effects in terms of image, which ultimately help it to generate profit, as explained in the parliamentary debates on the law of 4 July 1990[25].

Therefore, even though they are not direct economic effects, these effects must be real and they must be proportionate to the commitments incurred. The shareholders, who must be informed of these operations, will verify this aspect. And like any act of management by the company’s executives, this right of oversight would seem legitimate, given that the shareholders waive a portion of the profits accruing to them.

“A philanthropic act is a means of promoting a business in line with its commercial strategy, but it is also a general-interest act that contributes to enhancing a common heritage.

When a business decides to help the community by encouraging research, artistic creation or the protection of heritage, recourse to philanthropy is not solely defined by the cultural activity itself, but also by the aim of improving the firm’s image. Therefore, corporate philanthropy is, like sponsorship, part of a firm’s communication strategy.

As a result, businesses account for their philanthropic expenditures in a variety of ways. This diversity is found in the way it is recognised for tax purposes: Articles 238 bis or 31.7 of the Tax Code.

In practice, as the tax category applicable to the disinterested donation does not correspond to the very objective of firms and may even appear to conflict with company law, firms tend to include this expenditure in their overheads[26].

q As Dan Roskis points out in his study on corporate philanthropy, “in the absence of established case law specific to philanthropy[27], the principles developed by the law and the courts in matters of fraudulent use of corporate property result in the corporate interest of a philanthropic operation being considered according to three criteria. These criteria are the amount of philanthropic expenditure, the managers’ personal interests and lastly the expected effects of the operation.”[28].

Therefore, to check whether the expenditure incurred by the business is consistent with its corporate interest, the following conditions must be met:

  • The philanthropic expenditure must be proportionate to the corporate patron’s capacity.

This proportionality is determined based on the company’s size and financial capacity.

However, the proportionality of the company’s commitment to the funded action remains subject to uncertainty, and the expected success of the action must prevail over its actual result.

  • The funded operation must not serve the personal interests of managers.

Here, this notion is tantamount to the concept of fraudulent use of corporate property, defined by the French Commercial Code as the case in which “managers use the company’s property or credit, in bad faith, in a way which they know is contrary to the interests of the company, for personal purposes or to encourage another company or undertaking in which they are directly or indirectly involved”[29].

As with any criminal penalty, these criteria are interpreted narrowly.

  • The funded operation must be planned according to the effects identified by the business[30].

As mentioned above, the philanthropic operation is not considered with regard to any direct and proportionate consideration for the donation made, but based on the benefits the company expects to receive in return.

Furthermore, this interpretation would be contrary to the very concept of philanthropy as we saw above and which, by nature, entails an impoverishment of the funder.

In this respect, the notion of a direct link between the amount paid and the consideration received which characterises an economic exchange, such as sponsorship, should not be confused with the company’s direct or indirect interest, as this direct link is incompatible with the very concept of philanthropy. This raises the question of whether the philanthropic action, despite being performed without any proportionate consideration, took into account the company’s object and goals (promoting its image to employees, customers, etc.).

r In this respect, the fiscal concept of ‘irregular act of management’ can be used.

This is because, although the company’s philanthropic act cannot be regarded as a normal business transaction, like sponsorship for example, neither can the act run counter to the corporate patron’s interests.

Broadly speaking, an irregular act of management is an act that burdens the company with an expense or loss or which deprives it of revenue without being justified by its business interests[31].

The concept of irregular act of management here boils down to the tax rules applicable to the deductibility of a company’s expenses.

When a business incurs any kind of expenditure, it is only deductible if it meets the following conditions[32]:

  • it must correspond to an actual expense for the company,
  • it must be posted in the expenses for the year in which it was incurred,
  • it must be sufficiently evidenced,
  • it must relate to the ordinary running of the business and be incurred in its direct interest.

In principle, therefore, only donations made in a company’s direct interest as part of its ordinary business management are deductible (unlike the concepts of corporate interest and fraudulent use of company property that are specific to companies, the concept of irregular act of management also applies to sole proprietorships).

This apparent incompatibility between philanthropy and the objectives pursued by a business finds legal recognition in the provisions of Article 238 bis of the French Tax Code which authorises corporate philanthropy within certain limits.

In this regard, philanthropy has a positive connotation which can effectively rub off on the corporate patron. Therefore, even where the intention is purely donative, i.e. without expecting any consideration in return, the donation is not necessarily devoid of interest for the company on a social level. As one author remarks[33], “while corporate philanthropy is gratuitous in the economic sense, it generally aims to promote the company’s brand image or activity to the public, its customers and its staff”. Simply, “unlike a sponsor, a patron does not expect any immediate or short-term economic benefit, which is financially quantifiable and proportionate to the initial investment, in return for its action[34]“.

So, in practice, philanthropy is not contrary to corporate interest insofar as it potentially enables a business to engage in positive communication and obtain social or moral benefits which, although indirect, uncertain, diffuse and difficult to quantify, are also very real.

This intrinsic aspect of philanthropy can also be seen in the way a donation is treated for accounting purposes. For the business, philanthropic expenditures are expenses relating to ordinary operations recognised in the “Advertising, publication, public relations” account (“other external expenses” line). Therefore, in all cases, an expense relating to the company’s image and communication is initially deducted from the profit, independently of the preferential tax treatment applicable to philanthropy, and without this expense being considered a form of sponsorship.

At this stage, the business may decide to reintegrate the amounts to determine the taxable profit, in order to benefit from the tax reduction within the framework of philanthropy. But in our opinion, it could easily leave this expenditure in operating expenses without benefiting from the tax advantages, possibly at the risk, depending on the situation, of blurring the benefit of the act for the company.

This analysis is confirmed by fiscal doctrine relative to the rules of deductibility of donations according to which donations are deductible as expenses where the commercial interest of the business is taken into consideration.

The doctrine specifies that:

“Donations and grants that are not made in the company’s business interest have the nature of liberalities which must be reintegrated to determine the taxable profit. However, the question of whether, by providing an advantage to a third party, the company did or did not pursue a purpose extraneous to its activity, is mainly a question of fact and can only be answered in the light of the specific circumstances of each case”[35].

For all the reasons mentioned above, the concept of business interest referred to in fiscal doctrine must not be confused with the concept of commercial consideration, as the donation would then be deemed a sponsorship operation, in the absence of any donative intent. The concept effectively refers to the corporate purpose of the business (and it shall be noted that fiscal doctrine defines specific rules for the deductibility of sponsorship costs[36]).

However, beyond this legal recognition, corporate philanthropy must contribute to the company’s corporate interest, through the choices the corporate patron makes.

A business must therefore always take its corporate interest into account when defining its philanthropy policy, and ensure that the resources its devotes to its philanthropic action are proportionate.

  1. Compatibility of corporate philanthropy with corporate interest

A move towards jurisprudential, and possibly legislative, confirmation

The above analysis would today appear to be confirmed by the case law of the Conseil d’Etat which, in a plenary decision handed down on 9 May 2018, emphasised that philanthropic expenditures should be linked to donations, “which must be posted, depending on the case, in an “external services” account, linked to the class-15 accounts “general operating expenses”, or to the class-22 “non-recurring expenses” account, as stipulated in the regulation of 23 April 1999 also mentioned in point 3, according to which donations should be recognised, depending on the case, in the non-recurring expenses mentioned in account 6713 “donations and liberalities”. Philanthropic expenditure incurred by a business must, therefore, be posted in non-recurring expenses when, in the particular circumstances, especially where they are not recurrent, they cannot be linked to the company’s usual and ordinary activity, and in operating expenses when they can (…)”[37].

Owing to the purely fiscal nature of this ruling, it is pointless trying to further justify how a business could recognise philanthropic outlay as an expense, since this outlay meets the conditions of deductible expenses incurred by the company.

This possibility, which the Conseil d’Etat‘s decision would appear to confirm, is also consistent with the current trend of recognising the growing role that businesses play in society.

Although the “Pacte” bill has not been passed at the time of drafting this paper, the report by Nicole Notat and Jean-Dominique Senard on “the company – an objet of collective interest”, reflects a strong tendency to attribute to a legal entity company a role that exceeds the sole aim of making savings or sharing profits with a view to integrating this dimension into the achievement of its purpose, and therefore into its corporate object.

As this report states, even though “a company’s primary role is not to serve the general interest, growing expectations of firms are also expressed, owing to the development of environmental and social challenges”.

Moreover, “every company has a raison d’être that cannot be reduced solely to profit”.

To integrate these aspects, among other criteria (short-termism, financialisation weighing on companies, collective interests, social and environmental challenges, etc.), the authors of the report recommend a change of legislation to take this dimension into account.

These recommendations particularly include:

  • Adding a second paragraph to Article 1833 of the Civil Code: “[…] The partnership must be managed in its own interest, having regard for the social and environmental challenges of its activity”,
  • Confirming in Article 1835 of the Civil Code the possibility of including a “raison d’être” in a company’s bylaws, irrespective of its legal form, particularly to allow mission-led businesses.

A second paragraph would then be added: “The company’s object may indicate the raison d’être of the company established“,

  • Giving boards of directors and supervisory boards the task of drafting a “raison d’être” to guide the company’s strategy taking account of its social and environmental challenges.

Article L225-35 of the Commercial Code would therefore be completed with the words underlined: “The board of directors determines the broad lines of the company’s business activities, with reference to the company’s raison d’être, and ensures their implementation, in accordance with Article 1833 of the Civil Code”,

  • Recognising mission-led businesses in legislation (Article L.225-100-1 of the Commercial Code), accessible to all legal forms of company, provided that four criteria are met: (1) the company’s raison d’être is stated in its bylaws; (2) it has an impact committee endowed with resources, possibly consisting of stakeholders; (3) compliance with the raison d’être stated in the bylaws is assessed by a third party and publicly accounted for by the governing bodies; (4) a declaration of non-financial performance is published, as required by companies having over 50 employees.

This report, the proposals of which were included in the Pacte bill submitted to the Council of Ministers on 18 June 2018, raises questions about the French tendency to want legislation to address issues that should above all be a matter of people’s individual and social responsibility, particularly company shareholders. But it has to be said that, especially if it were integrated into legislation, this trend would dispel the last psychological misgivings over the compatibility between philanthropy and corporate interest, and all the more, over the compatibility between the preferential tax treatment of philanthropy and the rules applicable to deductible business expenses.

In the end, this analysis should contribute to developing best practices for corporate philanthropy. We will particularly note that:

  • A corporate patron must ensure that its philanthropy policy and philanthropic actions take its corporate interest into account: this would not be the case, for example, if a company were to make an anonymous donation in order to keep it totally concealed. This would be an irregular act of management contrary to its corporate interest;
  • The philanthropic actions targeted by the company must fall within the scope of preferential tax treatment applicable to corporate philanthropy;
  • Notwithstanding the effective deduction of philanthropy from the company’s profits under the preferential tax treatment[38], a company’s philanthropic expenditures must meet the general conditions of deductibility of corporate expenses.

The donation must therefore have a real justification and be part of a company’s ordinary business management.

Consequently, before it undertakes or funds philanthropic action, a company should at least start by defining the project, to ensure that it is consistent with the objectives the company pursues.

By Laurent Butstraën

[1] Law no. 90.559 of 4 July 1990 creating corporate foundations
[2] National Assembly, session of Monday 28 May 1990, p.1688, address by Mrs François de Panafieu
[3] Panorama national des générosités – Observatoire de la philanthropie – Fondation de France
[4] Report to the minister for the ecological and inclusive transition, the minister of justice, and the minister of the economy, finance and industry – 9 March 2018
[5] Article 893 of the French Civil Code
[6] Article 894 of the Civil Code
[7] Article 895 of the Civil Code
[8] Articles 931 et seq. of the Civil Code
[9] For an example of nullity of the clauses and conditions of a liberality stipulated in a private document, see Cour de cassation Civ. 1, 17 October 2007 no. 05-14818, JCP N 2008 no. 37, 1281 note Van Steenlandt
[10] E.g.: admission of a transfer from account to account as a gift by hand – Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1, 12 July 1966 – D. 1966.614 note H. Mazeaud
[11] Cour de Cassation, Civ. 1, 12 June 1967, D. 1967.584 Note BRETON
[12] N. Peterka, les dons manuels, pref. P. Catala LGDJ 2001 no. 139
[13] N. Peterka, Les dons manuels, pref. P. Catala LGDJ 2001 no. 157
[14] Article 795 of the French Tax Code
[15] Article 777 – Table III of the French Tax Code
[16] Articles 200, 238 bis and 757, 3° of the French Tax Code
[17] Article 710-1 of the Civil Code
[18] BOFiP impôts BOI – PART – ISF -30-20-20-20120912 §200
[19] Article 902 of the Civil Code
[20] Article 902 of the Civil Code
[21] Article 1832 of the Civil Code
[22] Cour de cassation, commercial section, 13 December 2005, no. 9896 RJDA 3106 no. 273
[23] Definition of corporate social responsibility according to the European Commission, Commission Green Paper 2001 “Promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility
[24] Law no. 99.1172 of 30 December 1999, Article 238 bis of the French Tax Code
[25] JOAN 28 May 1990, p. 1688
[26] JO AN 28 May 1990 p. 1688
[27] Subject to the recent decision of the Cour de Cassation (Crim., 5 March 2014 referred to below in no. 31, Dan Roskis’ analysis remains relevant.
[28] Mécénat d’entreprise, Dan ROSKIS, January 2008. Rep. DS
[29] Articles L.241-3.4 (SARL), L.242-6.3 and L.242-3 (SA), and L.244-1 (SAS) of the French Commercial Code
[30] Mécénat et Parrainage – Guide juridique et fiscal, Xavier DELSOL, Editions Juris-Service, 2004
[31] Mémento pratique Francis Lefebvre Fiscal 2014 no. 78150
[32] Article 39-1 of the French Tax Code
[33] Alexis Chauveau-Maulini, L’abus de bien sociaux dans l’ombre du mécénat, Juris Association no. 379, 15 May 2008.
[34] Xavier Delsol, Mécénat et Parrainage, Editions Juris-associations, 3rd edition, 2003, p.26.
[35] BOI – BIC – CHG – 40-20-40, no. 310
[36] BOI – BIC – CHG – 40-20-40, no. 170 et seq.
[37] CE, Plenary session, 9.5.2018 – no. 388 209, Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de Pyrénées Gascogne
[38] Article 238 bis of the French Tax Code

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